The Red Team

GK: It's a pleasure to talk with you again, David, it's been a long time.

David: Indeed it has, and I'm glad to see you too.

GK: OK, first off, what's the Red Team?

David: We're an independent shop within CIA. We pick up pretty much anything we want, and we develop our own analysis. I run it.

GK: Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't the fact of having a Red Team implicitly acknowledge that Agency analysis, in a routine way, gets wrapped up in policy?

David: Yes, that's true. It's almost impossible, maybe even theoretically impossible, to produce a purely objective analysis of anything. So the Red Team is a mechanism to deliberately thwart, or compensate for, the administration's policy bias.

GK: OK, then, what about Chaosistan? What's your main conclusion?

David: We believe that Afghanistan, in the best of circumstances, is ungovernable. The Afghans like it that way, as a loose association of regions, peoples, tribes, clans, etc., etc.

GK: And in the worst of circumstances?

David: An outside actor who attempts to corral these Afghan groups will be attacked, overtly or covertly, from all sides. If the outside actor, for example, tries to ally itself with one faction, such as the Karzai faction, not only will the other groups actively oppose that alliance but the Karzai faction itself will always seize the opportunities for corruption and advantage over its adversaries. There's no common ground for political compromise.

GK: So there's no hope of creating a coherent Afghanistan from scratch. That leaves a couple of policy options, notably trying to manage the chaos at arms length. How would that work?

David: First, we leave. Second, we talk with the Taliban — the actual representatives of the Pashtun — and try to figure out what kind of carrots we might offer. It's not the same as making deals with the Sunni in Iraq because the Pashtun are in a much stronger position, but we could probably do business. The main American concern should be whatever foreign terrorist networks might still remain in Afghanistan. The point is, we would have more leverage over those networks at a distance than we would in the middle of an interminable fight.

GK: It sounds easy, "We leave." But how?

David: We just announce that we can't find a political partner to work with and pack up and go. By the time it dawns on the Afghans that we're really and truly leaving, we'll have already left. The winter is actually a good time for this, because we would have relative mobility while the Afghans don't.

GK: And what would the Brits say, or our other allies with forces in Afghanistan?

David: Publicly, they'd complain. Privately, they'd be ecstatic.

GK: What do you think would be the effect of our withdrawal on the situation in Pakistan? Might it not make things worse?

David: No, because Pakistan's ISI would go right back to supporting the Taliban overtly. The Pashtuns would be happier and less likely to carry a jihad into Pakistan, and the Pakistani military would be happier that Afghanistan again had become clearly hostile territory for Indian influence. We believe an American withdrawal from Afghanistan would have a significant calming influence on the situation in Pakistan.

GK: Did your analysis include considerations of what the U.S. military preferences might be, or those of the White House?

David: No, that would have been too much.

GK: But McChrystal has already leaked word of "Chaosistan" — what do you think that means?

David: It means that if he can't have a full-blown war he's thinking getting out might be a good idea.

GK: David, thanks very much for talking with me. And I understand you're planning to retire in December. Do you think that at that time you might do an interview with me for real?

David: We'll see.

GK: I forget whether already you owe me a favor or it's the other way around.

David: I'm certain it's the latter!

GK: Ha! Thanks again, David.

David: You're very welcome.