Electric Politics | How (Not) To Control a Bureaucracy

Illustration by George Herriman for Archy and Mehitabel, by Don Marquis Stupid. Stupid. Stupid. That's my reaction to Jim Jones and his "expanded" NSC. I know — most people outside Washington DC don't care about how the NSC is organized or about bureaucratic inside baseball. But that doesn't mean it isn't important. When the consequences involve issues like war and peace they affect all of us, like it or not. And there's a good reason why the State Department has traditionally (with exceptions depending upon personality) exercised primacy over American foreign policy: It knows something about the rest of the world. The same cannot be said for the NSC, not by any stretch of the imagination. So the probabilities increase that we'll try to impose ourselves abroad, on many issues more tolerated than welcomed, if that. Paradoxically, the probabilities also increase that the President will end up exercising less influence over foreign policy, not more, the exact opposite of what's intended. All things considered it's an easy bet that Jim Jones' shop will quickly become dysfunctional. (Just watch Afghanistan, which will prove my point.)

For all its many, many faults, the State Department does a reasonable job of rotating officers back and forth between overseas assignments and Washington. By the time one reaches a senior rank one would have to be magnificently ignorant to have failed to learn something about the world, although it happens. NSC staff might be State Department officers on detail, or they might not. There's no guarantee that NSC staff know much about anything; their primary qualification is an informal relationship with the President or somebody close to the President. Normally, that's OK, because State brings some perspective to the table, but if State is officially subordinated in an NSC policy process that perspective automatically becomes devalued.

Moreover, in the past, some Presidents (like Nixon) have tried, unsuccessfully, to consolidate power in the executive office of the President, which includes the NSC, as opposed to relying upon Cabinet agencies to do their jobs. It's a question of trust, or more precisely, mistrust. The paradox is that as the office of the President grows larger and more powerful it escapes the control of the President. Instead of delegating large swathes of policy to trusted Cabinet members and hoping for the best while leading through a combination of charisma and political savvy, the President winds up in the weeds, overwhelmed by detail. Or the President by default delegates too much power to his close assistants who, unlike Cabinet secretaries, experience far fewer formal constraints on their actions.

President Bush's practice of delegating to Vice-President Cheney, who ran his own "shadow government," clearly didn't work. But the solution isn't to try to do the same thing all over again with different players and increased gusto. Much better that the President pick trusted confidants for the Cabinet, give them a lot of independence while trying to stay above the fray, and that he concentrate on how best to set general policy directions. The NSC should be an honest broker and a place for the national security apparatus to coalesce around policy. It should not be in the driver's seat.



Home FAQ Contact Archive EP Store EP Alerts © 2010 ElectricPolitics	How (Not) To Control a Bureaucracy Stupid. Stupid. Stupid. That's my reaction to Jim Jones and his "expanded" NSC. I know — most people outside Washington DC don't care about how the NSC is organized or about bureaucratic inside baseball. But that doesn't mean it isn't important. When the consequences involve issues like war and peace they affect all of us, like it or not. And there's a good reason why the State Department has traditionally (with exceptions depending upon personality) exercised primacy over American foreign policy: It knows something about the rest of the world. The same cannot be said for the NSC, not by any stretch of the imagination. So the probabilities increase that we'll try to impose ourselves abroad, on many issues more tolerated than welcomed, if that. Paradoxically, the probabilities also increase that the President will end up exercising less influence over foreign policy, not more, the exact opposite of what's intended. All things considered it's an easy bet that Jim Jones' shop will quickly become dysfunctional. (Just watch Afghanistan, which will prove my point.) For all its many, many faults, the State Department does a reasonable job of rotating officers back and forth between overseas assignments and Washington. By the time one reaches a senior rank one would have to be magnificently ignorant to have failed to learn something about the world, although it happens. NSC staff might be State Department officers on detail, or they might not. There's no guarantee that NSC staff know much about anything; their primary qualification is an informal relationship with the President or somebody close to the President. Normally, that's OK, because State brings some perspective to the table, but if State is officially subordinated in an NSC policy process that perspective automatically becomes devalued. Moreover, in the past, some Presidents (like Nixon) have tried, unsuccessfully, to consolidate power in the executive office of the President, which includes the NSC, as opposed to relying upon Cabinet agencies to do their jobs. It's a question of trust, or more precisely, mistrust. The paradox is that as the office of the President grows larger and more powerful it escapes the control of the President. Instead of delegating large swathes of policy to trusted Cabinet members and hoping for the best while leading through a combination of charisma and political savvy, the President winds up in the weeds, overwhelmed by detail. Or the President by default delegates too much power to his close assistants who, unlike Cabinet secretaries, experience far fewer formal constraints on their actions. President Bush's practice of delegating to Vice-President Cheney, who ran his own "shadow government," clearly didn't work. But the solution isn't to try to do the same thing all over again with different players and increased gusto. Much better that the President pick trusted confidants for the Cabinet, give them a lot of independence while trying to stay above the fray, and that he concentrate on how best to set general policy directions. The NSC should be an honest broker and a place for the national security apparatus to coalesce around policy. It should not be in the driver's seat. Posted by George Kenney on February 8, 2009 2:38 AM « Yes, for Judd Gregg \| Main \| My New Jeep » Share this post: Leave a comment Name Email Address URL Remember personal info? Comments (You may use HTML tags for style)

How (Not) To Control a Bureaucracy

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