So Come On: Jack Be Nimble

The principal feature of the American foreign policy bureaucracy—hierarchy—means that at the best of times it can cope with a limited number of major crises. This is a large part of the explanation why, for example, the US had so much trouble responding to (arguably, failing to forestall) the Yugoslav breakup in the latter part of 1991: decision-makers, as well as all the bureaucratic hamsters, were exhausted from Gulf War I, Operation Desert Storm. Other recurring organizational failings are important too, such as not moving information up and down the chain of command as needed—a particularly noteworthy shortcoming in the Baker State Department—but to my mind the "just a few crises at a time" limit trumps the others. Thus, when I see an article like this describing the accelerating disintegration of Iraq I know pretty much for certain that, because the US is now distracted with Israel and Lebanon, Iraq has moved beyond the point of no return. For a host of other reasons, for a couple years the most prudent policy would have been withdrawal; now it may well be that in the context of an inevitable withdrawal the main thing to worry about is that it not turn into a rout.