Toy Soldier

Of a couple propositions, though, we can be relatively certain. So long as US forces remain, they generate an armed, violent opposition. The tide of battle may appear more or less favorable at any given moment but ultimately it is not militarily winnable. A lot of people have written about this; among them William Lind provides perhaps the most interesting, cogent analysis. Scattered MSM reports indicate that to a certain extent the military recognizes the problem and that its solution is the correct one: withdrawal. We shall see. Second—a rather subtler point—our efforts often may have unintended consequences the opposite of what we expect. Martin Sieff and John Simpson note this in respect to elections: holding three national elections within the space of a year has tended to harden communal divides rather than bridge them. (Sieff and Simpson both covered the civil war in Yugoslavia and seem to have learned from their experience.) Other American actions aimed at forcing a national government upon the Iraqis may well have similar negative effects. Thirdly, a proposition/prediction: if and as communal fighting worsens, following past practice (thinking again particularly of Yugoslavia) the US will likely pick factions and demonize the one(s) we oppose. In the former Yugoslavia such a strategy didn't carry heavy potential penalties since its factions were largely insulated from the outside world. In the Middle East, however, it is a different story, where a misstep easily could enlarge the problem by an order of magnitude.

Left, right, center, or fusion, the practical strategic thinker faces a decision that practically decides itself: leave now with all deliberate speed or muddle along into more treacherous wastelands.